Axiomatizations of two types of Shapley values for games on union closed systems

A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A (single-valued) solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. A well-known solution is the Shapley value. In the literature various models of games with restricted cooperation can be found. So, instead of allowing all subsets of the player set N to form, it is assumed that the set of feasible coalitions is a subset of the power set of N. In this paper, we consider such sets of feasible coalitions that are closed under union, i.e. for any two feasible coalitions also their union is feasible. We consider and axiomatize two solutions or rules for these games that generalize the Shapley value: one is obtained as the conjunctive permission value using a corresponding superior graph, the other is defined as the Shapley value of a modified game similar as the Myerson value for games with limited communication. © 2010 The Author(s)

Minimum cost spanning tree problems with groups

Minimum cost spanning tree problems, Coalitional value, Cost allocation, C71, D70, D85,

The family of cost monotonic and cost additive rules in minimum cost spanning tree problems

In this article, we define a new family of rules in minimum cost spanning tree problems related with Kruskal’s algorithm. We characterize this family with a cost monotonicity property and a cost additivity property.Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología y FEDER | Ref. SEJ2005-07637-C02-01Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología y FEDER | Ref. ECO2008-03484-C02- 01-ECONXunta de Galicia | Ref. PGIDIT06PXIB362390PRXunta de Galicia | Ref. d INCITE08PXIB3000- 05P

A characterization of Kruskal sharing rules for minimum cost spanning tree problems

Minimum cost spanning tree problems, Kruskal’s algorithm, Sharing rules,

Allocating slacks in stochastic PERT network

The SPERT problem was defined, in a game theory framework, as the fair allocation of the slack or float among the activities in a PERT network previous to the execution of the project. Previous approaches tackle with this problem imposing that the durations of the activities are deterministic. In this paper, we extend the SPERT problem into a stochastic framework defining a new solution that tries also to maintain the good performance of some other approaches that have been defined for the deterministic case. Afterward, we present a polynomial algorithm for this new solution that also could be used for the calculation of other approaches founded in the deterministic SPERT literature

Stable partitions in many division problems: the proportional and the sequential dictator solutions

We study how to partition a set of agents in a stable way when each coalition in the partition has to share a unit of a perfectly divisible good, and each agent has symmetric single-peaked preferences on the unit interval of his potential shares. A rule on the set of preference profiles consists of a partition function and a solution. Given a preference profile, a partition is selected and as many units of the good as the number of coalitions in the partition are allocated, where each unit is shared among all agents belonging to the same coalition according to the solution. A rule is stable at a preference profile if no agent strictly prefers to leave his coalition to join another coalition and all members of the receiving coalition want to admit him. We show that the proportional solution and all sequential dictator solutions admit stable partition functions. We also show that stability is a strong requirement that becomes easily incompatible with other desirable properties like efficiency, strategy-proofness, anonymity, and non-envyness

Stable partitions in many division problems: the proportional and the sequential dictator solutions

We study how to partition a set of agents in a stable way when each coalition in the partition has to share a unit of a perfectly divisible good, and each agent has symmetric single-peaked preferences on the unit interval of his potential shares. A rule on the set of preference profiles consists of a partition function and a solution. Given a preference profile, a partition is selected and as many units of the good as the number of coalitions in the partition are allocated, where each unit is shared among all agents belonging to the same coalition according to the solution. A rule is stable at a preference profile if no agent strictly prefers to leave his coalition to join another coalition and all members of the receiving coalition want to admit him. We show that the proportional solution and all sequential dictator solutions admit stable partition functions. We also show that stability is a strong requirement that becomes easily incompatible with other desirable properties like efficiency, strategy-proofness, anonymity, and non-envyness